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Abstract
The feminist critique of language has been contested from its very inception. 
Opponents have distanced themselves from feminist proposals by arguing, 
for example, that language and reality are separate entities; that linguistic 
disparity is insignificant in comparison to other forms of discrimination; and 
most of all, that feminist approaches are ‘unscientific’. In this paper, I explore 
the late 1970s dispute between Senta Trömel-Plötz, Hartwig Kalverkämper 
and Luise F. Pusch as a particular example of the feminist vs. ‘scientific’ 
position. These three linguists are prominent voices in the German-language 
context and their arguments provide a valuable insight into the nature of 
gender and language debates in general. As I aim to show in the following, 
even empirical evidence does not necessarily bring a close to the discussions.
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A brief history
To set the scene for the dispute between Senta Trömel-Plötz, Hartwig 
Kalverkämper and Luise F. Pusch, a brief historical overview of feminist 
linguistic debates is needed. While it is of course difficult, if not impossible, 
to pinpoint the exact moment when gender came to the forefront of linguists’ 
minds, Robin Lakoff’s 1973 essay ‘Language and Woman’s Place’ is often 
considered a key starting point. As Lenora A. Timm comments in her review 
of Lakoff’s essay, ‘[Lakoff] has done pioneering work in an area which hitherto 
had been fairly well neglected by linguists, and even by sociolinguists’ (1976: 
251). Inspired by the civil rights movement in the United States during the 
1960s, Lakoff was one of the first linguists to put the focus on women’s disparate 
treatment in language. Two of her observations regarding gender and language 
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are here of particular interest. On the one hand, Lakoff considers societal power 
and linguistic practices as essentially linked, and on the other, she sees the 
different power positions reflected in language. 
  In reference to her first observation Lakoff states: ‘[t]he language of 
the favored group, the group that holds the power, along with its non-linguistic 
behavior, is generally adopted by the other group, not vice-versa’ (1973: 50). In 
short, those who hold societal power seem to dictate general language use as 
well. Regarding her second observation she comments, ‘[o]ften a word that may 
be used of both men and women ..., when applied to women, assumes a special 
meaning that, by implication rather than outright assertion, is derogatory to 
women as a group’ (1973: 57). In addition to the dominance of the ‘favored 
group’ in terms of use, the ‘other group’ is also limited in meaning. The term 
‘professional’ is one example given by Lakoff, which often has very different 
connotations when used for women and men. Male professionals are, according 
to the author, generally perceived as experts in a certain professional field 
who happen to have a sex. Professionals who are women, however, are often 
considered ‘professional’ in the latter sense only. According to Lakoff, with 
men as the ‘favoured group’, and further, with women predominantly restricted 
to sexual beings in relation to men, a professional ‘minus male’ can only be a 
prostitute.
  Senta Trömel-Plötz, who obtained her PhD in the U.S., was strongly 
influenced by work such as Lakoff’s. When Trömel-Plötz returned to Germany, 
she transferred the feminist critique of the English language to her native 
context. Her 1978 essay ‘Linguistik und Frauensprache’ (Linguistics and 
Women’s Language2) problematised women’s representation in the German 
language for the first time. 
Senta Trömel-Plötz
In agreement with Lakoff, Trömel-Plötz considers the linguistic treatment of 
women a central expression of bias. She states, ‘[d]ie Diskriminierung besteht 
gerade sehr oft darin, wie eine Frau angeredet oder nicht angeredet wird’ 
(discrimination manifests itself very often in the way women are addressed 
or not addressed) (1978: 50). Just as in the English language, Trömel-Plötz 
proposes, terms such as ‘professional’ largely connote ‘male’ in German. The 
connotation ‘female’ often becomes visible only in the specific. But while the 
English language has the impact of social gender to contend with, German is 
additionally burdened with grammatical gender. ‘Der Profi’, ‘der Fachmann’ 
or ‘der Experte’, which are all translations of the term ‘professional’, are 
grammatically masculine as well. 
  Trömel-Plötz uses the example ‘der Zuhörer, er’ (the listener, he), to 
illustrate the issue. ‘Der Zuhörer, er’ is meant to address both men, and women 
and men collectively. However, if only women are addressed, ‘der Zuhörer, 
er’ is always modified to ‘die Zuhörerin, sie’ (the listener, she) (1978: 51-52). 
Unsurprisingly, this causes confusion as to when and whether women are 
addressed by ‘der Zuhörer, er’. Trömel-Plötz believes the default understanding 
of terms such as ‘der Zuhörer, er’ is ‘male’ first and foremost. These terms are 
CHRISTIANE
LUCK4 TROPOS
therefore often described as generic masculine terms and the weighting towards 
the connotation ‘male’ has the following effect according to Trömel-Plötz: ‘das 
maskuline grammatische Geschlecht und der Mann als Referent [sind] die 
Norm ... und die femininen Formen mit der Frau als Referent die Abweichung. 
Der Mann dominiert auch in der Sprache’ (the masculine grammatical gender 
and man as the referent are the norm … and the feminine forms with woman as 
the referent the deviation. Man also dominates in language) (1978: 56). In line 
with Lakoff, the author considers societal power and linguistic practices to be 
linked.
  Trömel-Plötz’s essay was published in Linguistische Berichte, which 
is a prominent and widely-read journal. Among its readership are proponents 
of her ideas, but also opponents to her point of view. Hartwig Kalverkämper 
is a central voice of the counter-argument and I discuss his 1979 response to 
Trömel-Plötz’s ‘Die Frauen und die Sprache’ (Women and Language) next.
Hartwig Kalverkämper
In the following analysis of Hartwig Kalverkämper’s argument, I am particularly 
interested in the language he employs to deconstruct Trömel-Plötz’s position. 
Kalverkämper considers himself to occupy a, if not the, scientific position. 
And in doing so, he tries to distance himself from Trömel-Plötz’s line of 
reasoning. As he states in the introduction to his essay: ‘[d]abei geht es mir 
nicht darum ... mich an dem plakativen Geschlechterstreit und Rollenkampf 
direkt zu beteiligen ...; es geht mir vielmehr darum, die linguistische 
Wissenschaftsposition, die methodologischen Implikationen des Beitrags unter 
die Lupe zu nehmen’ (I am not interested in participating in the blatant battle of 
the sexes; I am concerned with analysing the linguistic and scientific position, 
and the methodological implications of [Trömel-Plötz’s] contribution) (1979: 
56). And as the reader learns throughout the course of Kalverkämper’s essay, 
linguistics as a science is everything Trömel-Plötz’s argument is not. 
  To give a few examples from his analysis; Kalverkämper states that 
semantics is ‘logisch inspiriert’ (inspired by logic) (1979: 58) while Trömel-
Plötz’s methodology shows ‘Verlorenheit der Gedankengänge’ (incoherent 
trains of thought) (1979: 60). Kalverkämper argues, ‘[er geht] die Problemlage, 
ein sprachliches Phänomen, linguistisch an’ (he approaches the issue, a 
linguistic phenomenon, linguistically) (1979: 65) while Trömel-Plötz’s approach 
is ‘unlinguistisch’ (un-linguistic) (1979: 60). And finally, Kalverkämper says 
one should show ‘Verantwortung vor der Wissenschaft’ (responsibility toward 
science) (1979: 60) whereas Trömel-Plötz’s work is ‘unwissenschaftlich’ 
(unscientific) (1979: 67). In short, the author believes he has objective distance 
from the issue while Trömel-Plötz does not. Kalverkämper bases this judgement 
on Trömel-Plötz’s linking of grammatical gender and biological sex. Generic 
masculine terms, according to the author, do not evoke men rather than women 
but are simply an efficient feature of language. 
  Nevertheless Kalverkämper does admit: ‘[d]as soll allerdings nicht 
kategorisch besagen, daß die Sprachgemeinschaften in Einzelfällen nicht 
doch eine Beziehung zwischen Genus und Sexus, zwischen Sexus und Genus 
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erstellten’ (this does not mean that speech communities have not created 
a link between grammatical gender and sex, between sex and grammatical 
gender in certain individual cases) (1979: 60). Such cases might be ‘die Mutter, 
sie’ (the mother, she), which is always grammatically feminine, or ‘der Vater, 
er’ (the father, he) which is always masculine. While these are obvious and 
seemingly isolated examples, Kalverkämper further reveals that these ‘certain 
individual cases’ are not quite as ‘individual’ as he first makes them out to be. 
In fact, the link between grammar and sex is well established as the author 
explains in his comment on job titles: ‘[e]rst in einer Zeit, in der Frauen in 
öffentliche Stellen, in die verschiedensten Berufssparten drängen, wird man 
sich der Notwendigkeit bewußt, für die neuen Inhaberinnen dieser Stellen neue 
Berufsbezeichnungen zu suchen’ (only once women enter the public sector, 
and other diverse lines of business, will speakers realise the necessity to find 
new job titles for the holders of these roles) (1979: 61). In effect, Kalverkämper 
confirms that terms such as ‘der Minister’ (the minister), ‘der Bundeskanzler’ 
(the chancellor) and ‘der Experte’ (the professional) connote ‘male’ despite their 
supposed gender-neutrality. Only the creation of terms such as ‘die Ministerin’, 
‘die Bundeskanzlerin’ und ‘die Expertin’, according to the author, will express 
otherwise.
  Considering that Kalverkämper in essence agrees with Trömel-Plötz, 
what exactly makes her position unscientific? Luise F. Pusch’s 1979 essay ‘Der 
Mensch ist ein Gewohnheitstier, doch weiter kommt man ohne ihr’ (The human 
is a creature of habit but you get further without her) picks up on the confusion 
of Kalverkämper’s argument. 
Luise F. Pusch
Luise F. Pusch is a prominent voice in the German-language context and her 
1979 response to Kalverkämper established her as a key proponent of the 
feminist critique of language. In contrast to Kalverkämper, Pusch argues in 
close proximity to Trömel-Plötz’s position. Her answer to the author’s claim 
that Trömel-Plötz presents an incoherent argument on grammar and sex is 
as follows. ‘Trömel-Plötz “verwechselt” nicht Sexus und Genus, sondern sie 
analysiert gezielt die Beziehungen zwischen der grammatischen Kategorie 
Genus und dem Sexus der Referent/inn/en’ (Trömel-Plötz does not “confuse” 
sex and grammatical gender but analyses the relationship between the 
grammatical category and the sex of the referent) (1979: 96). In fact, Pusch 
believes Kalverkämper misunderstood Trömel-Plötz’s position to begin with. 
She adds: ‘[e]s geht ... eindeutig um ein referenzsemantisches Problem, um die 
Frage nämlich, ob Aussagen mit Personenbezeichnungen aller Art ..., tatsächlich 
in der postulierten Weise funktionieren’ (this is clearly a reference-semantic 
issue; the question is whether terms really refer to human beings as they claim 
to) (1979: 94). 
  That ‘claim’ and reality are often at odds is effectively illustrated by 
Kalverkämper himself. However, even in his subsequent response to Pusch, 
‘Quo Vadis Linguistica? – Oder: Der feministische Mumpsimus* in der 
Linguistik’ (Feminist Mumpsimus in Linguistics), he refuses to amend his 
original position. To Kalverkämper, feminist linguistics remains ‘unscientific’. 
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In the late 1970s, the theoretical argument seems at a dead-end. Inspired 
by, or more accurately, frustrated with, this ideological deadlock, empirical 
researchers have tried to open up the debate. 
Empirical studies
Josef Klein’s 1988 ‘Benachteiligung der Frau im generischen Maskulinum – eine 
feministische Schimäre oder psycholinguistische Realität?’ (Discrimination of 
women by generic masculine terms? – a feminist delusion or psycholinguistic 
reality?) is one study attempting to determine which position holds most merit. 
To find out, Klein conducted two tests: ‘Test A’ included 158 participants, 
among them 84 women, and ‘Test B’ 74 female and 54 male respondents. He 
explains, ‘für Test A [wurden] kurze Texte entworfen, deren Kopf-Satz jeweils 
ein generisches Maskulinum enthält, z.B. “Jeder Einwohner der Stadt Aachen 
...”’ (for Test A short texts were created of which the first sentence included 
a generic masculine term, such as “Every citizen (masculine) of Aachen ...”) 
(1988: 312). Participants were then asked to select the most suitable referent.
  To distract respondents from the true nature of the experiment, the 
focus was placed on stylistic rather than sex-specific choices. Participants were 
required to select amongst ‘first name-last name’ or ‘title-last name’ options, 
such as ‘Nicola Meier’ or ‘Frau Meier’. Visualised in a graph, Klein’s findings 
look like this (see Figure 1 below):
 Figure 1: Participants’ interpretation of ‘citizen (masc.)’ in contrast to an equal 
understanding
The author explains, ‘[v]on der Gesamtgruppe werden 69 % der Lücken durch 
Nennung eines männlichen Vornamens oder der Anredeform “Herr” und nur 
20 % durch Nennung einer entsprechenden weiblichen Form ausgefüllt’ (the 
participants chose a male first name or the title ‘Mr’ 69% of the time, and the 
female equivalent only 20% of the time) (1988: 315). In short, respondents seem 
to interpret the generic masculine term as predominantly ‘male’.
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‘Test B’ acted as a point of comparison. Generic masculine terms were replaced 
with dual-forms, such as ‘Jede Einwohnerin/jeder Einwohner der Stadt Aachen’ 
to allow for women’s linguistic visibility. However, as Klein comments:
[O]bwohl die grammatische Struktur der feminin/maskulinen 
Doppelform die Testpersonen geradezu aufdringlich darauf stößt, 
daß der jeweiligen Personengruppe Frauen in gleichem Maße wie 
Männer angehören, bleibt auch hier das Übergewicht männlicher 
Geschlechtsspezifizierung und damit eine deutliche Prädominanz der 
Assoziation “Mann” .... 
(Even though the participants are reminded explicitly by the 
grammatical structure of the feminine/masculine dual-form that 
women are equally part of the group as men, the sex-specification 
“male” and the association “man” remain distinctly predominant.) 
(1988: 316)
Consequently, the bias male-as-norm impacts on participants’ ability to 
imagine female ‘inhabitants’ whether the masculine grammatical gender is used 
generically or not. But as Klein concludes, ‘[d]as generische Maskulinum hat 
allerdings eine deutliche Verstärkerwirkung. Bei seiner Verwendung liegt der 
Vorsprung männlicher Geschlechtsspezifizierung ... im Durchschnitt um 18 % 
höher’ (generic masculine terms increase the sex-specification “male”, which 
is on average 18% higher) (1988: 319).This effectively confirms Trömel-Plötz’s 
position.
  One study is, of course, not enough to conclude an argument, and 
various empirical studies have been undertaken since. Lisa Irmen and Astrid 
Köhncke’s 1996 research ‘Zur Psychologie des “generischen” Maskulinums’ 
(On the psychology of “generic” masculine terms) presented 45 participants, 
among them 27 women, with sentences in which a key term was underlined. 
Respondents had to decide whether the previously highlighted term, such 
as a relatively gender-neutral job title, corresponded with a certain category 
presented in the follow-up sentence. Irmen and Köhncke found: ‘[d]er Itemtyp 
GM-F [generisches Maskulinum und Frau als Kategorie] wurde in der Regel 
mit “nein” beantwortet’ (the correspondence of a generic masculine term with 
women as category was generally answered by “no”) (1996: 159). 
  Karin M. Frank-Cyrus and Margot Dietrich’s 1997 study ‘Sprachliche 
Gleichbehandlung von Frauen und Männern in Gesetzestexten: Eine 
Meinungsumfrage der Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache’ (Linguistic equality 
of women and men in legal texts: A survey by the Gesellschaft für deutsche 
Sprache) followed on to compare the perception of generic masculine terms, 
such as ‘der Vertreter, er’ (the representative, he) to more gender-inclusive 
forms, such as ‘Vertreter und Vertreterinnen’. 734 respondents, of them 63% 
women, were asked to assess which version adequately represented women and 
men. In a graph participants’ perceptions of generic masculine terms look like 
this (see Figure 2): 
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 Figure 2: Participants’ evaluation of generic masculine terms
Frank-Cyrus and Dietrich explain: ‘88 % der Antwortenden finden Frauen beim 
Gebrauch generischer Maskulina ungenügend berücksichtigt ... 60 % halten 
sie sogar für überhaupt nicht berücksichtigt’ (88% of the respondents thought 
women were insufficiently addressed when generic masculine terms were used 
… 60% thought they were not addressed at all) (1997: 62).
  None of the studies I consulted – the final being Dries Vervecken, 
Bettina Hannover and Ilka Wolter’s 2013 German- und Dutch-language 
study ‘Changing (S)expectations: How Gender Fair Job Descriptions Impact 
Children’s Perceptions and Interest Regarding Traditionally Male Occupations’ 
– showed any evidence for Kalverkämper’s position. In effect, empirical science 
seems on the side of Trömel-Plötz and Pusch. But what impact did these 
empirical results have on the argument between Trömel-Plötz, Kalverkämper 
and Pusch? Did they bring closure to the debate on gender and language? In 
the final section of this paper I evaluate recent responses to women’s and men’s 
linguistic representation in an attempt to provide an answer.
Contemporary responses
As those who have been watching the 2014 FIFA World Cup might know, the 
German national anthem still sings of ‘Vaterland’ (fatherland) and ‘brüderlich’ 
(brotherly) rather than ‘Heimatland’ (homeland) and ‘gemeinschaftlich’ 
(jointly). Masculine language use is still fairly common-place in Germany, 
and it is not only common-place, changes continue to be strongly resisted. A 
recent amendment of the constitution of the Universität Leipzig shows how 
deep the resistance runs – and how similar the presented arguments sound to 
Kalverkämper’s position. 
  In June 2013, the Universität Leipzig amended generic masculine 
terms, such as ‘Professoren’, in its constitution to generic feminine terms, such 
as ‘Professorinnen’. Despite plausible counter-arguments of simply ‘reversing-
the-roles’, this change makes sense on three accounts. Firstly, ‘Professorinnen’ 
can be argued to linguistically include ‘Professoren’ whereas the reverse cannot. 
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Secondly, the use of one term, rather than the dual-form ‘Professoren and 
Professorinnen’, eases communication. And thirdly, ‘Professorinnen’ makes 
women more linguistically visible. Considering that this change only concerns 
the constitution and not any other language use, one might assume responses 
would be equally moderate. But, as the 62 comment pages to the Spiegel 
Online article ‘Sprachreform an der Uni Leipzig: Guten Tag, Herr Professorin’ 
(Language reform at the Universität Leipzig) show, Kalverkämper’s arguments 
are still alive today. 
  According to many language users, feminist language change is still 
considered ‘Blödsinn’ (nonsense); ‘albern und peinlich’ (silly and embarrassing); 
and essentially ‘unlinguistisch’ (un-linguistic). One commentator effectively 
reproduces Kalverkämper’s position: ‘[d]er Gebrauch des generischen 
Maskulinum ist nicht Ausdruck einer patriarchalischen Weltordnung, sondern, 
total unpolitisch, Ausdruck von Spracheffizienz’ (the use of generic masculine 
terms is not an expression of a patriarchal world-order, but entirely apolitically, 
an expression of linguistic efficiency) (2013: n. pag.). Equally, linguists carry on 
debates similar to those of the 1970s (see the exchange between Hans-Martin 
Gauger and Luise F. Pusch in particular). 
  While empirical studies might support Trömel-Plötz and Pusch’s 
position, as the above examples illustrate, the feminist critique of language 
remains a contested field and the debate around gender and language ongoing. 
In effect, the dominant standpoint seems to hold sway in spite of the empirical 
evidence. This poses the question: is science really an arbitrator of truth in 
feminist linguistic debates? Nevertheless, the new constitution of the Universität 
Leipzig is a poignant example of what Trömel-Plötz and Pusch have achieved. 
Over the past forty years, despite continued opposition from both within and 
outside of academia, feminist linguists have raised considerable awareness 
of discrimination through (German) language use as well as affected change. 
Whatever the attempts to keep more inclusive language use at a distance, the 
work of feminist linguists continues to bring it closer to becoming a reality.
Endnotes
1   The argument and discussion in this paper form part of my thesis.
2   All translations are my own.
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